Summary. Despite its potential pitfalls, ecological inference is an unavoidable part of some quantitative settings, including US voting rights litigation. In such applications, the analyst will typically encounter two-way tables with more than two rows and columns. Although several ecological inference methods are currently available for 2 2 tables, there are fewer options for analysing general R C tables, and virtually none that model counts as opposed to fractions. We propose a count R C method that respects the bounds deterministically, that allows for complex relationships between internal cell quantities, that is easily extensible and that results from transparent assumptions. We study the method via simulation, and then apply it to an example that is drawn from the state of Texas relevant to recent redistricting litigation there.
Introduction and basic notation
Ecological inference, or the effort to draw conclusions about statistical relationships at one level from data that are aggregated to a higher level, has a long history in statistics. Particularly when conceptualized in terms of an effort to predict the internal values of a set of contingency tables when only the row and column totals are observed, ecological inference has well-known pitfalls, primarily that substantively different internal cell counts can give rise to the same marginal totals (Robinson, 1950) . This potential has led some to the respectable view that this form of inference should never be attempted (e.g. Freedman et al. (1991) ), but in certain applications, including US redistricting litigation, there is little alternative (see Greiner (2007) ).
To date, the overwhelming majority of research on ecological inference has focused on a set of contingency tables with two rows and two columns, but in many settings (including redistricting) the relevant tables are usually larger. For this reason, we build on work by Brown and Payne (1986) and Wakefield (2004) to propose a model and a corresponding fitting algorithm for R × C tables. Our method may be seen as a generalization of a model for 2 × 2 tables that was articulated by Wakefield (2004) , although not the generalization that Wakefield himself proposed. The advantages of our method include the following: (a) deterministic respect for the bounds (see Duncan and Davis (1953) ) within a parametric structure (see King (1997) ) that permits coherent expression and exploration of prior assumptions; (b) correspondence to a well-specified model at the level of the units subject to aggregation (voters, in redistricting) , which facilitates incorporation of survey information, assessment of assumptions and explanation of the method to lay audiences; (c) a focus on counts instead of fractions; (d) allowance for complex relationships among counts inside the contingency tables; (e) flexibility to explore a variety of extensions.
We note, however, that the basic form of our model, as is true of almost all ecological inference methods, is not immune to aggregation bias.
We organize this paper as follows. We briefly discuss existing R × C ecological inference techniques before listing our goals in formulating our proposal. We then outline our method (including its motivation), identify quantities of interest, examine priors, present simulation results and apply the method to a data set. We continue with a discussion of extensions of the method before concluding.
To motivate the quantitative problem, we suppose that we seek inferences about the voting behaviour of different racial (racial or ethnic) groups, and we observe the data aggregated to the level of the precinct. We use the symbol N row COLUMN i to refer to the (unobserved) count in a particular cell of the ith precinct, where rows represent races and columns represent political parties (and non-votes); i runs from 1 to I , the number of precincts in the jurisdiction, and there are R rows and C columns in each precinct's table. We italicize unobserved counts but leave observed quantities in ordinary type. For illustrative purposes, we focus on the case of 3 × 3 precinct tables; extension of the method that we propose to tables of different size and shape is obvious. Table 1 clarifies our representations. Some models (although not ours) work with the fractional quantities that are generated by dividing each cell by its corresponding row total. We label unobserved internal cell fractions β row COLUMN i ; so, for example, β bD i = N bD i =N b i . X row i refers to the racial population share of the ith precinct, so X h i = N h i =N i .
Existing R C techniques, and goals
One classification of existing R × C ecological inference techniques separates methods that eliminate or collapse rows and/or columns from methods that estimate all internal cells simultaneously. Elimination of columns (e.g. the 'single regression' of Grofman et al. (1985) ) or rows (e.g. Benoit et al. (2004) ) proceeds via an undesirable assumption that cells corresponding to a particular category exhibit no systematic patterns. Collapsing methods (e.g. King (1997)) typically involve successive application of 2 × 2 techniques to sets of tables that are formed by combining row and/or column categories to form supertotals (see Ferree (2004) for a discussion of the drawbacks of at least one collapsing technique). We prefer methods that estimate all cells of precinct tables simultaneously.
A different classification of existing methods turns on whether they predict fractions (βs, in our notation) or counts (Ns). The distinction is subtle but important. Models in the former category include the linear model (whether constrained, per Gelman et al. (2001) , or unconstrained; see Achen and Shively (1995) ), King's (1997) ecological inference, the hierarchical method of Rosen et al. (2001) and the information theoretic proposal in Judge et al. (2004) . Our uncertainty with this approach begins with the interpretation and use of the βs, particularly in light of the fact that, in many applications, quantities of interest are functions of the internal cell counts (the Ns) in the precinct tables. For example, Judge et al. (2004) (who also used redistricting examples) characterized the βs as row probabilities. If the βs are row probabilities, however, it would seem that inference about the internal cell counts would require specification of a separate distribution of the counts given these probabilities (such as a multinomial), but Judge et al. (2004) instead suggested that predictions for the internal counts should be calculated deterministically as the product of the (observed) row totals and the βs.
The choice to work with counts versus fractions also constitutes a fundamental decision about how to treat precincts of varying size. For example, most fraction models would treat precinct Tables 2 and 3 (which we make 2 × 2 to illustrate our point) as having an identical amount of information about the turnout of blacks. Although the concept is difficult to quantify rigorously, models that work with counts would treat Tables 2 and 3 differently in that Table 3 might have greater information on black turnout behaviour than Table 2 . Such treatment might be preferable depending in part on whether the analyst wishes to build a model from the individual voter upwards.
The discussion above rests on certain desiderata for an R × C ecological inference method; we now list these explicitly. First, we seek an R × C method that respects the bounds on the interior cell counts deterministically. Second, we seek a method that works with counts (as opposed to fractions) inside the precinct tables, a choice which provides a closer fit to the data-generating process (see, for example, Prentice and Sheppard (1995) in epidemiology) by means of an individual level model of voting behaviour. Such a model facilitates communication and assessment of modelling assumptions to other scholars and to lay audiences while easing the incorporation of individual level survey information. Third, we seek a technique that is sufficiently flexible to explore within-row and between-row relationships. In the redistricting context, for example, relationships between voter choices in electoral contests involving more than one candidate of each race may shed light on whether voting in the jurisdiction is cued on the basis of race. The model that we propose is sufficiently flexible on this score, and we use simulation to study how the aggregation process causes differing amounts of loss of information for between-and within-row relationships. Fourth, an R × C technique should allow for a variety of extensions.
Our proposal
3.1. The individual level model and basic structure We begin with our individual level model. We take precinct boundaries and the racial composition of each precinct as fixed, thus assuming that the way in which precinct boundaries are drawn is unrelated to the data-generating process. We then suppose that each potential voter has a probability of supporting the Democrat, of supporting the Republican or of abstaining from voting. In the basic form of the model, the potential voter's probability vector depends on exactly two things: his or her race and the precinct in which he or she lives. Individual voting decisions are mutually independent. This motivation results in a product multinomial complete-data likelihood at the bottom level of the hierarchy (see Brown and Payne (1986)) . At the second level of the hierarchy, we apply a logistic transformation to the multinomial probability vectors within each precinct, choosing the 'abstain' column as our reference category (see Aitchison (2003) ). The transformation results, for each precinct, in a set of R vectors, each having support in the (C − 1)-dimensional Euclidean space of real numbers. At this point, when discussing R × C precinct level tables, Wakefield (2004) proposed a 'simple model' that assumes that the R vectors all come from the same (C − 1)-dimensional normal distribution. Our difficulty with this approach is that, in the voting rights context, it would mean that black, white and Hispanic voting patterns are the same. When considering 2 × 2 precinct level tables, Wakefield articulated a bivariate normal prior with an off-diagonal term to model dependence (see Wakefield (2004) , section 5.4). This is a superior approach, and we generalize it here.
Thus, we stack the R-vectors (each of dimension C − 1) into an overall precinct vector of transformed probabilities and assume that each stacked vector is an independent manifestation of an R.C − 1/-dimensional normal distribution. The result is what we believe to be a previously unproposed extension of the additive logistic normal model from Aitchison (2003) . For computational convenience, we put semiconjugate priors on the mean and covariance matrix of the normal distribution. In symbols, for the case of precinct tables of Table 1 form, our proposal has the following structure: level 1,
and similarly for ω w i and ω h i ,
In block matrix form, subparts of μ and Σ are interpretable as governing relationships within and between precinct table rows. For example, if Σ bw = Σ bh = Σ wh = 0, well-known properties of the multivariate normal distribution imply that the rows of each precinct table are conditionally independent. This special case of our method bears a structural resemblance to the proposal in Rosen et al. (2001) , although within-row relationships (which are governed by Σ b , Σ w and Σ h ) are less constrained in the former because we use the stacked additive logistic normal distribution instead of mutually independent Dirichlet distributions. Meanwhile, Σ b 's off-diagonal terms govern the relationships within the top row of Table 1 .
The observed data posterior
Thus far, we have not conditioned on the column totals; they are functions of the complete data, which are unobserved. To obtain the observed data posterior, we must sum out undetermined cells in each precinct table and integrate out the θs. Continuing with our Table 1 example, we sum out the four top left-hand cells, which produces
. 11/ N obs is a matrix, the ith row of which (N obs i ) contains the row and column totals for precinct i's contingency table, and θ i = .θ
'lb' and 'ub' stand for lower bound and upper bound respectively. The notation in the summation symbols above reflects the fact that the ranges of the sum for inner summations depend on the values of the variable in outer summations. ω Å i is ω i thought of as a deterministic function of θ i : not a random variable.
The above expression can be understood as follows. Lines (1) and (2) represent the prior as well as the integration over the missing Ns and θs. Lines (3) and (4) are the contribution from precinct i's multinomials: one for each precinct table row. Line (5) is the stacked additive logistic normal distribution. Line (6) is the Jacobian of the transformation from ω-space to θ-space. Lines (7)- (9) compel the rows and columns to sum to their respective observed totals. Lines (10) and (11) represent three separate sum-to-1 constraints for a precinct's θ-vector.
We fit the model by using a Gibbs sampler (Tanner, 1996) , producing predictions of the internal cell counts (functions of which are often the quantities of interest) at every iteration in a manner that respects the bounds deterministically. Appendix A has the details.
Priors and quantities of interest
Identifying quantities of interest and assessing the implications of priors are especially critical in ecological inference, where the two are intimately connected. Wakefield (2004) demonstrated that, in this setting, seemingly innocuous choices of priors can have unexpected consequences, such as concentration of prior mass at extreme values of a parameter space. Moreover, we have found the ill-defined but near universal desire for 'flatness' in a prior a challenge to achieve. Priors that appear reasonably non-informative for one quantity of interest with one jurisdiction's racial pattern and for a particular election may no longer be so when applied to a different quantity of interest, or a different racial pattern or a different election.
For illustration, we discuss two sets of quantities of interest that are relevant to recent Texas redistricting litigation that reached the US Supreme Court (see LULAC versus Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006 and Hebert et al. (2006) ). As applied to 3 × 3 tables such as Table 1 , the first consists of Λ bD = Σ i N bD i =Σ i .N bD i + N bR i /, and similarly for Λ wD and Λ hD , i.e. the fraction of each race's voters who support the Democrat. These quantities ordinarily determine whether voting is 'racially polarized'. The second set is the fraction of voters who are members of a particular race, i.e. 
composition of 31% Hispanic, 20% non-Hispanic any part black and 49% other (white); there were six precincts that were 90% or more black, 14 that were 90% or more white and none that were 90% or more Hispanic. Lacking a better idea, we set K 0 = κ 0 I dim.Σ/ and Ψ 0 = ψ 0 I dim.Σ/ , where both κ 0 and ψ 0 are scalars. With this in mind, an instinctive approach to choosing prior values might suggest that ν 0 and ψ 0 , which can be roughly conceptualized as the number of pseudodistricts and the precision that is added in the prior, should be set low, that κ 0 should be large (to reduce the influence of μ 0 on the posterior) and that μ 0 should be set under the expectation that approximately 50% of potential voters do not vote. The histograms in Figs 1(a) and 1(b) show simulations from a prior distribution that reflects such choices; in short, instincts are untrustworthy. The prior for Λ bD is undesirable for an analysis focusing on this quantity because mass is concentrated at extreme values of parameter space, substantively corresponding to a belief that voting in the jurisdiction is polarized. Meanwhile, the prior that is induced on Γ b is insufficiently diffuse, with values above 0.6 having essentially no mass. The histograms in Figs 1(c)-1(f) show potentially appropriate values for analyses in which interest is in Λ bD (Figs 1(c) and 1(d) ) and Γ b (Figs 1(e) and 1(f)); note that hyperparameter values that induce a prior that is reasonable for one quantity might be less useful for the other quantity.
Simulation studies
We present the results of simulation studies of our model, which we conducted by using our running example of contingency tables of Table 1 form. Our research design begins with the identification of four dimensions to vary when generating data: the distribution of .X b i , X w i , X h i / T , which controls whether each table's units typically fall principally in one or another row or are spread more evenly across rows; κ 0 , which controls the variation in expected behaviour of units across sets of contingency tables (data sets); μ 0 , which controls whether (within each table) members of one row behave differently from members of another row in expectation; and the expected N i , corresponding to small and large numbers of units in each table. In terms of our running example, these dimensions translate to the level of housing segregation in a jurisdiction of interest, the expected uniformity of voting behaviour across jurisdictions, the expected extent of voting polarization and expected precinct size. These dimensions give us 2 4 = 16 possible data-generating processes. We draw 100 data sets from each of 16 design combinations. Appendix A has the details.
We studied coverage rates, lengths of 90% and 95% posterior credible intervals (which were formed by equal-tailed quantiles) and other quantities with respect to the 21 hyperparameters in .μ, Σ/, the nine internal cell count totals that are represented by Σ i N rc for r = (b, w, h) and c = (D, R, A), Λ rD for r = (b, w, h) and turnout by race. We present some results for the quantity Λ hD and for correlation coefficients of the Σ-matrix. We focus on Λ hD because, in our running example of US redistricting, inference about Hispanic voting patterns can be more important and more complex than inference for the corresponding whites and blacks patterns, the importance stemming from the potential for Hispanics to serve as swing voters, and the complexity stemming from their (generally) lower turnout rates (a circumstance that is mirrored in our simulations).
Coverage rates of all quantities for 90% and 95% intervals varied stochastically around nominal with no discernible pattern across simulation dimensions. For example, the rates for the 95% intervals of Λ hD in the 16 simulations that are identified in Table 4 were .0: 98, 0:97, 0:94, 0:95, 0:89, 0:94, 0:89, 0:94, 0:96, 0:98, 0:97, 0:93, 0:98, 0:94, 0:96, 0:96/. More interesting was the variation in the lengths of the posterior intervals across simulation dimensions. Because the complete data (i.e. the internal cell counts) were drawn from the model, and because coverage rates were stochastically similar, these lengths measure the amount of information that the model can recover after the aggregation of internal cell counts to row and column margins. Table 4 reports the (0.25, 0.75) quantiles of the lengths of 95% intervals for Λ hD in the various simulation scenarios. Lower numbers mean smaller intervals and thus more information. A comparison of the top and bottom halves of Table 4 provides evidence of something that researchers have long guessed: that greater information is available when contingency table units tend to fall largely in one or another table row. More surprising is the fact that, at least for the (non-linear) function of the complete data represented by Λ hD , greater information is available when the behaviour of units in row r is different from the behaviour of units in row r Å . The italic figures in Table 4 illustrate this fact: all else being equal, intervals for polarized data tend to be smaller than intervals for non-polarized data. Wilcoxon tests of a null hypothesis of equal mean interval lengths, run on the eight polar versus non-polar pairs of interval length vectors, resulted in p-values (to four decimal places) of .0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0:0061, 0:0017/. Similarly, lower uniformity in expected voting behaviour tends to push values of μ (across units tend to concentrate within one row. 'High uniformity' refers to low variation in expected voter behaviour across jurisdictions, i.e. predictability of unit behaviour across data sets. 'Polar' refers to whether voting is racially polarized, i.e. whether (within each table) members of one row behave differently from members of another row (in expectation). 'Large' refers to the number of potential voters (units) in each precinct. The numbers in the cells represent the 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles of the lengths of the 95% posterior intervals for Λ hD . Cell comparisons show how each simulation dimension affects the amount of information that is lost in aggregation. For example, comparison of the two cell values in italics suggests that, for highly segregated housing patterns in small precincts with low voter uniformity, greater information is available about Λ hD when Hispanic voting patterns differ from those of blacks and whites (i.e. voting is polarized as opposed to non-polarized).
jurisdictions) into the extreme of the parameter space, making recovery of the bounded quantity Λ hD easier.
Similar reasoning yields conclusions regarding the relative loss of information in betweenand within-row relationships, a subject that previous R × C ecological inference models could not assess because the former were assumed away. Recall from Section 3.1 that, for example, the off-diagonal terms of Σ b govern the relationships between the quantities within the top row of Table 1 , whereas Σ bw governs the relationships between the quantities in the top row of Table 1 versus those of the second row. To assess the comparative loss of information due to aggregation, we examined the coverage rates and posterior intervals for the three within-row correlations (one each for Σ b , Σ w and Σ h ) as compared with the 12 between-row correlations (four each for Σ bw , Σ bh and Σ wh ). Recovery rates of 95% intervals for both sets of quantities were nearly identical: 95.52% for within-row correlations versus 95.02% for between-row correlations (the difference was not statistically significant under standard tests for equal proportions). But, as Fig. 2 demonstrates, larger intervals were needed to recover between-row correlations. Wilcoxon tests suggested that these results were not due to random variation. Note also that Fig. 2 implies that, at least in some data sets, the data contain information about between-and within-row relationships in that the posterior intervals are sufficiently narrow for substantive conclusions (all this, of course, conditional on the model).
Application to real data: Bush versus Gore in Texas Congressional District 24, 2000
We apply our method to the Bush versus Gore Presidential contest as run in the precincts comprising Texas Congressional District 24 in 2000. One of the issues in LULAC versus Perry was whether Texas Congressional District 24 'performed' for African-Americans, despite the fact that blacks comprised only 20% of its voting age population. The allegation was that AfricanAmericans could control the Democratic primary, then join with Hispanics and some whites Fig. 2 . Boxplots of the lengths of 95% posterior intervals for all between-and within-row correlations in the Σ-matrices from our simulations: the within-row correlations generally have smaller intervals than the between-row correlations, despite stochastically identical coverage rates; this suggests greater loss of information due to aggregation for between-row relationships (the latter generally leaning Republican) to enable a Democratic victory. In 2000, the most competitive contest in the relevant precincts was the Presidential election, with Vice-President Gore winning 51-49; this contest also had the largest turnout.
The expert witnesses in LULAC versus Perry used a variant of the method of bounds as well as regression to assess racial voting patterns, but these methods yield either useless or physically impossible results for our data set. We fitted our model to the data by using five chains of 6 million iterations each, saving every 4000th draw. The method yielded 95% posterior intervals for Λ bD , Λ wD and Λ hD as follows: (0.988-0.999), (0.224-0.262) and (0.955-0.999) . 95% intervals for turnout for blacks, whites and Hispanics were (0.468-0.516), (0.445-0.469) and (0.079-0.113). In digesting these results, we proceed on two tracks: first, assessing their plausibility; second, drawing conclusions supposing the results to be accurate.
On the first point, all results seem quite reasonable except for the posterior distribution of Λ hD , which suggests implausibly pro-Gore preferences among Hispanic voters. Informal consultations with people who were familiar with voting patterns in the area lent support to our view that the Λ hD -results were suspicious. Fig. 3 demonstrates that one possible explanation for this result is aggregation bias. If white voters in predominantly Hispanic precincts supported Gore in greater fractions than white voters in predominantly white precincts, this fact, in combination with low turnout of Hispanics, might produce implausibly pro-Gore estimates for Hispanics. These results suggest that analysts should always compare a method's results with available external information for a data set. In our view, there are two primary defences against aggregation bias: obeying the bounds deterministically and adding information from surveys, covariates or other sources. Our proposal builds in the former and facilitates the latter (see below). Of course, neither defence is foolproof, and it can be difficult to know whether one has implemented the latter properly (Cho, 1998) .
Next, suppose that the results above were accurate. This is only one election, and there are various reasons why it might not be as indicative as other contests for inferences regarding racial bloc voting (e.g. both candidates are white). But if this pattern were evident in other general elections, and if blacks tended to dominate the Democratic primary (which is perhaps a reasonable hypothesis given their party preferences and turnout), then results like these support the assertion that District 24 performs for African-Americans, despite their 20% voting age population. African-American voters appear to be uniformly supporting a candidate of choice who is different from that of whites, but the black candidate of choice can prevail (barely) because of the support of the few Hispanics who vote and because of a small amount of crossover voting by whites.
Extensions
The ease with which our method may theoretically be extended is one of its appealing attributes. Extensions provide fertile ground for further research. We briefly mention a few here.
Because it begins with a model at the individual level, our method can incorporate certain kinds of survey information with relative ease. Continuing with our redistricting motivation, we confine our attention to a poll that might, with varying degrees of plausibility, be treated as a simple random sample of voters or potential voters in some precincts, perhaps a wellexecuted exit poll in a jurisdiction that, for legal reasons, tracks the races of people who enter polling booths (i.e. the Xs for each precinct table representing racial fractions of people entering or exiting polling places). We suppose that some form of polling is implemented in a subset S of the I precincts in the jurisdiction and contest of interest. In the ith precinct, let K i denote the number polled, K b i the number of in-sample blacks and K bD i the number of in-sample blacks voting Democrat, with similar quantities defined for other races and parties. Recalling our individual level model, the likelihood of observing a particular vector .
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In the posterior, after conditioning on the observed Ks (and thus adjusting, for each i ∈ S, the applicable Ns), adding lines (12)- (15) to lines (1)- (11) does not disrupt the basic nature of the model. In particular, the fitting process that is articulated in Appendix A for the basic model can proceed largely as before. Matters become more complicated if the jurisdiction does not record the races of people entering polling booths (i.e. the Xs for each precinct table representing racial fractions of people who could enter or exit polling places). Even accepting that we observe a simple random sample in precinct i of people exiting the polling place, it may be implausible to assume that the frame corresponding to this sample is the set of all potential voters in the precinct because too many potential voters stay away from the polls. One way to proceed here is to discard the information from any survey respondent who reports that he or she did not vote in the electoral contest of interest and to assume that the responses of those who did vote (again totalling K i in our notation) constitute a simple random sample in precinct i of actual voters. Under this assumption, the expression corresponding to lines (12)-(15) for the previously discussed case is
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In terms of sampling from the posterior, matters have become less agreeable. Any term involving a θ or an italicized N cannot be ignored, and the presence of such terms in line (16) means that the fitting strategy that is articulated in Appendix A is no longer directly applicable. Outside the exit polling context, other sampling schemes (e.g. stratified or cluster sampling) raise additional challenges, although addressing such challenges may be eased by the presence of a coherent individual level model. Other, non-sampling, extensions are also possible. For instance, in some applications it may be useful to allow row-or column-specific random effects to influence ω i . These effects could be assumed to be independent across tables or could be parameterized to allow for spatial, temporal or spatiotemporal associations across tables (Haneuse and Wakefield, 2004; Quinn, 2004) . The utility of such modelling strategies will obviously vary greatly across applications. Finally, our model is amenable to extensions that have been previously discussed in the literature. Covariates may be included by substituting regressions for μ. Robustness might be increased via the substitution of a more dispersed ellipsoidally symmetric distribution, such as multivariate t with known or unknown degrees of freedom, for the normal distribution. The normal structure at the upper level facilitates sharing of information between electoral contests across time and office via hierarchical techniques.
We caution that in applied work the analyst must consider whether possible extensions will be appropriate. The loss of information due to aggregation is known to be large, and adding complications to the basic method might demand too much from the data. Our point here is that our method provides a flexible structure within which researchers can explore what the data can tolerate and, correspondingly, how much can be learned.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a count ecological inference model that can handle data sets with precinct tables of any size and shape. Our method has certain advantages over previously proposed models, such as deterministic respect for the bounds, flexibility and correspondence to a plausible account of the data-generating process. We have discussed factors affecting the choice of prior in the redistricting context and demonstrated that careful thought is required here. We have used simulation studies from our model to assess the relative losses of information due to aggregation for various quantities that might be of interest to applied researchers. In substantive applications, we have shown how the results of our model may be useful in redistricting litigation.
